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ABSTRACT
Gender-specific protective labour laws are considered unacceptable by many analysts 
because it is presumed they must necessarily adversely affect employment opportunities for 
women. This paper reviews United States research which has sought to assess the validity 
of this assumption; and reports on the impact of these laws within Australia. The assumption 
that gender-specific labour laws adversely affect female employment opportunities is not 
supported by United States research or Australian data. It is concluded that a reform strategy 
centred on simple abolition may involve loss of employee protection without necessarily 
producing any compensating increase in opportunities for women.
INTRODUCTION
Most industrial societies have, at one time or another, introduced sex-specific legislation 
designed to protect female employees against work hazards and overwork. Such laws have 
included restrictions on the working hours of women, prohibitions on the employment of 
females in certain occupations considered especially hazardous, and restrictions on the 
maximum weights an employer may order women employees to lift. Over the last two 
decades, retention of this form of labour market regulation has been increasingly challenged. 
One of the major arguments advanced by those who advocate the abolition of these laws is 
that, while they may provide a degree of protection for women employees, they also cause 
job segregation and limit women’s ability to obtain employment (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1987; Connell, 1980; Coyle, 1980; Goldin, 1990; Heitlinger, 1979; 
Hutchins & Harrison, 1966; Nakanishi, 1983; Nielsen, 1980). Lehrer (1985: 187) puts this 
view forcefully:
At this point in time, “protective labor legislation” for women seems to be a 
contradiction in terms (an oxymoron, linguistically, somewhat like “clean bomb”). 
Labor laws that limit or circumscribe women’s work force participation or otherwise 
distinguish on the basis of sex are not only presumptively illegitimate...but are 
considered to discriminate against women by limiting their “competition” with male 
workers for relatively skilled or better-paid jobs, and consigning them to a sex- 
segregated job market.
This paper reviews American empirical research on sex-specific protective legislation, 
which has focussed on the impact of restrictive hours legislation for women, in order to 
determine whether it is necessarily the case that sex-specific laws invariably retard the 
employment opportunities of women. In Australia, the controversy over protective legislation
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has focussed on the effects of sex-specific weight lifting limits on the employment 
opportunities of women (New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board, 1984; Refshauge, 
1982). Australian data are therefore examined here in order to determine the extent to which 
the assumption that such weight limits restrict employment opportunities for women conforms 
with experience. The purpose of the paper is not necessarily to argue for the retention of these 
laws, but rather to initiate a factual basis for debate regarding the impact of these laws, and 
the likely benefits and costs of their abolition.
The manner in which sex-specific labour laws have been modified or abolished in the 
last two decades has varied greatly between nations. In sgme societies, the changes have 
involved a “levelling up” of protective standards, in others, a “levelling down”. The former 
approach extends to men the protection previously applying only to women, while the latter 
removes legal protection from women, thus leaving both sexes nominally equal in terms of 
their vulnerability. In some cases, a mixture of levelling up and levelling down of protective 
standards has been introduced. In these instances, protection for women has been weakened, 
and the same level of protection has been applied to men who were either previously 
unprotected or subject to lower levels of protection than the new standard.
In the United States, revamping of sex-specific labour legislation has clearly involved 
a levelling down. Critical developments inducing this process were the enactment of the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963, which forbade unequal payment for substantially equal work; and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, colour, 
religion, sex, or national origin. Sex-specific protective labour laws were subsequently 
challenged in the courts, and all such legislation was eventually abolished. The abrogation of 
these laws produced a marked decrease in the degree of legal protection enjoyed by female
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employees (Hill, 1979). Many of those who supported the abolition of the laws apparently did 
so because they assume that all workers now enjoy safe and comfortable conditions of 
employment. Baer (1978: 217), for example, argues that protective legislation is unnecessary 
because the industrialisation process has carried society to a stage where physical demands 
are no longer made of employees:
In a society in which workers have a considerable degree of choice of occupation, in 
which no one is forced to take dangerous jobs, and in which the physical 
characteristics of females do not produce burdensome disabilities, the only plausible 
justification which remains for this kind of treatment is the assignment of the domestic 
role to women as their primary task in society.
By contrast, the nations of Western Europe have generally adopted a less radical 
approach. Changes to the relevant laws have been monitored by the Commission of the 
European Communities. While recognising the need for the abolition of sex-specific 
legislation where the concern for protection which originally inspired these laws is no longer 
well-founded, the Commission has permitted member states to retain sex-specific laws in 
cases where it could be shown that there is a clear justification for differential treatment. 
Moreover, the Commission has argued that the obligation to ensure equal treatment for men 
and women must be seen within the context of the need to improve working conditions set 
out in Article 117 of the European Treaty. Hence, it has advised:
Equality should not be made the occasion for a disimprovement of working 
conditions for one sex, and it would be insufficient to simply take away 
necessary protections which are presently limited to one sex (Commission of 
the European Communities, 1987).
While most member nations of the EEC have sought to adopt reforms that accord with 
the guidelines, two member countries — Britain and Belgium — have ignored the
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Commission’s recommendations, and instead have opted for a levelling down of protective 
laws. This levelling down was introduced in the face of explicit opposition by the trade 
unions which represent the women employees most directly involved. In both Europe and the 
United States, unions have supported the process of reforming labour laws which discriminate 
against women. However, they have insisted that the elimination of the discriminatory content 
of these laws should not be purchased at the cost of their protective content. They have 
therefore opposed all policies which seek to achieve equality of opportunity by the levelling 
down process (Ashe, 1986; Bacchi, 1990; Commission of the European Communities, 1987; 
Deakin, 1990; Nakanishi, 1983).
A similar situation exists in Australia. Many employers, academics and professionals 
have been willing to support the abolition of sex-specific labour laws, even where this has 
involved a levelling down in the degree of protection enjoyed by women employees. 
Conversely, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and pro-labour feminists have supported 
the reform rather than the abolition of the old laws. Their argument is that a policy of 
levelling up is the only acceptable means of achieving equality between the sexes, given the 
danger to women that would be involved in lowering the legal protection they have 
traditionally enjoyed (Australian Council of Trade Unions, 1987; Bacchi, 1990; Bennett, 1984; 
Nyland and Kelly, 1992).
If serious debate regarding sex-specific protective labour law is to be conducted, it 
is imperative that systematic research into the impact of these laws be undertaken. Indeed, it 
should be considered unacceptable that laws designed to protect the health of employees can 
be abolished without undertaking such studies. This is particularly the case given the results 
of studies which indicate that a cavalier approach to labour law, which ignores the issue of
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sex differences, can result in women experiencing a disproportionate level of occupational 
injuries (Larsson, 1988). Finally, such research is needed because the victories won by the 
anti-protectionist alliance internationally have been challenged by those who accept that 
employees should have a legal right to safe and reasonable terms of employment. As Deakin 
observed:
A tendency towards “re-regulation” is apparent within the I.L.O., where calls for 
flexibilisation of Convention No. 89 on women’s night work have been combined with 
an insistence that any loosening of the general ban must be accompanied by new 
regulations aimed at protecting the health and safety of nightworkers and ensuring that 
any necessary derogations are the subject of consultation and agreement through 
collective procedures (Deakin, 1990: 17).
As a contribution to this debate, research conducted in the United States regarding the 
impact of sex-specific labour laws on women’s opportunities in the labour market will be 
reviewed. Evidence relating to the effects of manual handling legislation on the employment 
opportunities of Australian women will then be examined. The object is to determine whether 
it is the case that sex-specific labour laws necessarily disadvantage women employees. The 
effective reform of these laws requires substantive knowledge of the likely benefits and costs 
of reform. Given the danger involved in undermining the protection enjoyed by employees, 
economic rationalism alone must be considered an unacceptable basis upon which to found 
occupational health and safety policies.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE USA
In Muller v Oregon 1908, the Supreme Court of the United States established the 
constitutional validity of maximum hours restrictions for female employees. States could pass
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legislation restricting the working hours of women but were limited in their power to regulate 
the hours of men. The case was a turning point in three ways: it presented a factual case for 
maximum hours restrictions; it provided the first precedent for labour legislation in the United 
States; and it singled out women for coverage (Kirkby, 1987; Goldin, 1990).
Proponents of the legislation argued that long hours of work injured the health of 
women, the health and productivity of their offspring, and the quality of family life. Women 
and children were believed less capable of defending themselves from employers than were 
males, and therefore were seen to be in need of special protection to prevent their 
exploitation. Opponents of protective legislation, on the other hand, claimed such laws were 
discriminatory and undermined the attainment of true equality between men and women (c.f. 
Goldin, 1990). Moreover, it was asserted that the unions and the social feminists who 
supported sex-specific protective legislation did so merely in order to increase employment 
opportunities for men (c.f. Wilson & Sapiro, 1985).
While there is disagreement as to whether or not exclusion of women from industry 
was an important motive for the introduction of the protective legislation, it is commonly 
assumed by historians that the laws had an exclusionary effect (c.f. Kirkby, 1987; Landes, 
1980; Wilson & Sapiro, 1985). Recent studies have cast doubt on this assumption, and have 
tended to support research undertaken in the 1920s, which concluded that women were not 
disadvantaged by these laws (Breen, 1988; Goldin, 1988, 1990). Several analytic approaches 
have been employed to study the question. The Women’s Bureau Report (U.S. Department 
of Labor, 1928) relied on interviews supplemented by descriptive statistics. Landes (1980) and 
Goldin (1988) employed ad hoc single equation models using aggregate cross-sectional data; 
while Breen (1988) analysed regional time series data. We now review and evaluate studies
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which identify the effects of American sex-specific protective labour legislation starting with 
the research of the 1920s.
United States Department of Labor Women’s Bureau Report (1928)
The 1928 investigation into the effects of protective laws on women’s employment 
opportunities followed a controversy at the Second Conference on Women in Industry called 
by the Women’s Bureau of the United States Department of Labor in January 1926. At the 
conference, legislative regulation of the labour market was opposed by the National Woman’s 
Party and the National Association of Manufacturers (Lemons, 1973: 192-193). As a 
consequence, the Women’s Bureau undertook a nine-month investigation into the impact of 
sex-specific labour laws on the job opportunities of women. Work schedules were obtained 
from 1,661 establishments employing 665,561 employees in eleven states. Personal interviews 
were held with more than 1,200 working women who had experienced a change in the law, 
or who were employed under conditions or in occupations prohibited for women in some 
other state. Investigators also attempted to identify the impact of the laws by studying plant 
payroll records. The data were to be supplemented with interviews with employers and 
workers. Due to poor company record keeping, the statistical data collected were incomplete, 
forcing greater reliance on the use of interview data (U.S. Department of Labor Women’s 
Bureau, 1928).
Protective legislation covered only one third of the 8.5 million females in the U.S. 
workforce. The laws were oriented toward the control of conditions in industrial, mercantile 
and factory occupations. Business, professional women, and those in supervisory positions 
were generally not covered by labour laws, and it was primarily these women who demanded
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the abolition of the legislation (Goldin, 1990; Lemons, 1973). In general, the report concluded 
that protective labour laws as applied to women engaged in manufacturing processes did not 
handicap them, but rather served “to regulate employment and to establish the accepted 
standards of modem efficient industrial management” (U.S. Department of Labor Women’s 
Bureau, 1928: 54). In almost every kind of employment, it was concluded, the forces 
influencing women’s job opportunities were far removed from legislative restrictions on their 
conditions of work.
The investigation did uncover a small number of cases where men had been substituted 
for women as a result of restrictive hours laws, but concluded that the legislation had little 
adverse affect overall on the employment opportunities of women in the industries studied. 
The essence of the report’s conclusion has been well captured by Lemons.
[T]he major conclusion was that “labor legislation was not a handicap to 
women...it did not reduce their opportunities, and...it raised standards not only for 
women but for thousands of men too.” ...Limiting women’s hours was the one 
means of equalizing the position of men and women, and women were not 
handicapped by hours laws because men’s hours were shortened also. Far from 
being displaced, the states with the most advanced laws seemed to have the 
greatest opportunities for women to work. Instead of reducing the number of jobs, 
the reverse seemed to be true. In the final analysis, women’s job opportunities did 
not depend on legal regulation of the conditions of employment, but upon the 
employer’s idea of what were “women’s jobs” (Lemons, 1973: 195).
The Bureau’s report has been subjected to much criticism. Breen (1988) argues that many 
women in the forefront of jobs not traditionally open to women were disadvantaged, and that 
therefore their significance was far greater than the numbers involved. Similar arguments can be 
found in Berch (1975), Milkman (1980) and Kessler-Harris (1982). Lemons (1973), conversely, 
has observed that the laws studied by the Bureau usually forced upon the whole of industry only 
what the most advanced firms had adopted voluntarily. Lemons also reported that the Bureau was
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insistent that where the law was unfair to women, exemptions should be allowed. Further, he 
argues that the most celebrated of those incidences where women were dismissed were not in 
fact the result of the enactment of protective laws.
The Landes and Goldin Studies
Landes (1980) and Goldin (1988) conducted econometric studies into the impact of protective 
legislation on the employment opportunities of American women in the early years of this 
century. Both studies adopt an ad hoc single equation model, employed essentially the same data, 
but reached highly divergent conclusions. While Goldin attempted to separate the impact of hours 
legislation on male and female employees, Landes studied only the effect on women. Goldin 
estimated an identity in which mean scheduled weekly hours in 1919 (Hours 19) for all 
manufacturing workers in each state (and the District of Columbia) were regressed on variables 
causing hours to vary across states, such as a South dummy (South), and the percentage urban 
in the state (%Urban). She also included the percentage female in manufacturing employment 
(%Female), a dummy variable (LawDum) equal to one if the state passed a maximum hours law 
by 1914, and finally, an interaction between the last two terms (%Female x LawDum). Landes’ 
approach excludes the LawDum variable on its own as an independent variable, resulting in the 
impact of hours laws being constrained to fall entirely on female employees (see Appendix for 
a fuller explanation). The Landes model is therefore subject to specification errors.
The crucial results from Goldin’s and Landes’ estimated equations are reproduced here 
as Table 1. Landes’ results, using the more restrictive equation, suggest that protective legislation 
decreased scheduled hours of women by eight per week, one full weekday of work, or 15 per 
cent of mean scheduled hours. The coefficient on %Female indicates that women worked a full
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11 hours more per week than men did in states without maximum hours legislation. These 
conclusions, however, are not supported when Goldin’s more general equation is estimated.
Goldin’s coefficients reverse Landes’ findings and suggest a very different interpretation 
of the impact of protective legislation. Goldin finds that the legislation led to a reduction of 
about 1.8 hours per week for both male and female manufacturing workers, and no discernible 
difference in the reduction for male and female workers separately was apparent. Goldin 
interprets this result as reflecting a general desire by employees in states which introduced such 
legislation for a general decline in hours.
Criticisms over possible model misspecification were tackled by Goldin by using 
disaggregated data by industry for 1914 and 1919, using the 1920 Census of Manufactures, and 
estimating across states for industries in which there were virtually no female employees. The 
reduction in scheduled hours of foundry workers in states with maximum hours legislation 
covering only women was virtually identical to that derived from the full estimation. Such 
disaggregated data by industry was further employed to test the proposition that protective 
legislation was passed in states in which male labour lobbied vigorously for general hours 
reduction.
The results suggested that labour in male-intensive industries lobbied effectively for hours 
limits for females in states in which male labourers were ultimately successful at lowering their 
own hours. Organised labour in male-intensive industries appear to have supported lower female 
hours of work because the more employees working shorter hours, the greater the likelihood it 
would become the norm for all.
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T a ble  1. Im pa c t  o f  H o u r s  L e g isl a t io n  
o n  Sc h e d u l e d  W e ek l y  H o u r s  






























No. of Observations 49 49
Notes:
Dependent Variables
Hours'! 9 = Mean scheduled hours in manufacturing in 
1919
South = Dummy variable for southern states
%Urban = Percentage of state’s population that was 
urban in 1920
%Female = Percentage of the manufacturing labour force 
that was female
LawDum = 1 if the state passed its first enforceable 
maximum hours law by 1914
Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses
Neither of the equations were weighted to account for
heteroscedadicity, see Goldin (1988) for a justification of this
Sources: Landes (1980, 480); Goldin (1988, 193)
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While protective legislation may have been associated with a decline in the hours of 
all workers, male and female, it may also have contributed to a decline in female 
employment. Upon examining this possibility for the manufacturing sector, Landes and Goldin 
reached opposite conclusions. Landes concluded that hours legislation reduced female 
employment in manufacturing. The employment equation estimated had as the dependent 
variable the percentage of the total manufacturing labour force that was female in 1920 
(%Female), and the key independent variable accounted for the degree of restrictiveness of 
the state’s maximum hours legislation (Rest). To account for differences in the demand for 
or supply of female workers, additional variables were included — %Urban, Southern dummy 
and a lagged employment share in manufacturing capturing other relevant factors (EMP.j). 
The Rest variable measured the percentage of the state’s manufacturing labour force in 1909 
that worked over the legal maximum in effect in 1914. The variable accounts for prior 
conditions and gives the proportion of the labour force in 1909 that would be constrained by 
the hours legislation passed by 1914. Also included in Landes’ equation is a dummy variable 
(here Duml905-1914) if a state passed its first enforceable maximum hours law between 1905 
and 1914.
Column 1 in Table 2 shows the estimated regression results from Landes. It indicates 
that states with more restrictive legislation had a lower female employment share in 
manufacturing. Further estimations by Landes (not shown here) suggest that most of the 
decline in employment share occurred for daughters of the foreign-born and for foreign bom 
women. Landes concluded that hours legislation had been passed under the guise of 
humanitarian concern through the efforts of labour groups and others that stood to gain the 
most from restricting the employment of immigrant women and their daughters.
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The regression conducted by Goldin (column 2, Table 2) indicates a very different 
pattern. The difference arises primarily from the computation of the restrictiveness variable 
(termed WKRest by Goldin). The Rest variable computed by Landes used a weekly restriction 
that was always six times the daily restriction, even for states with lower weekly limits, 
despite the fact that the 1909 data used to create Rest was based on weekly scheduled hours. 
That procedure produced estimates that differ from those using the weekly legislation in 
twelve states. The WKRest variable differs from the Rest variable, on average, by a factor of 
10 across the twelve states.
Goldin’s results indicate that the WKRest coefficient is positive, but non-significant, 
and that on the hours legislation dummy variable is negative and barely significant. These 
results proved robust to restricting the sample to the forty states (and District of Columbia) 
that were used by Landes (eight mountain states which had few manufacturing workers were 
excluded); to weighting the regression by the square root of manufacturing employment in 
the state; and to estimating a (weighted) logistic transformation of the dependent variable. The 
evidence presented by Goldin therefore suggests that the employment share of women in 
manufacturing did not decrease with the restrictiveness of the legislation.
The results derived by Goldin using a regression equation in which the dependent 
variable is the percentage of sales (not clerical) labour force that was female in 1920, are 
provided in Column 3. Her results suggest that the female share of sales employment actually 
increased in states having more restrictive hours legislation. The coefficient on WKRest 
suggests that maximum hours legislation, by reducing daily hours in the sales sector, may 
have increased employment opportunities for women. Hence the restrictiveness of maximum
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hours legislation may have had little or no effect on female employment in manufacturing, 
and may have had a positive effect upon female employment in the sales sector.
T a b l e  2. E ffe c t  o f  H o urs  L e g isl a t io n  o n  
th e  E m p l o y m e n t  sh a r e  of W o m en  
in  M a n u fa c t u r in g  1920
Independent Landes Goldin Goldin-Sales
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Constant -0.00168 -0.013 0.150
(1.11) (1.28) (6.14)
EMP-i 0.79 0.753 0.772
(9.66) (11.4) (8.26)
South 0.0005 0.010 -0.006
(0.06) (1.16) (0.56)
%Urban 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0005
(2.26) (1.44) (2.52)
Duml905-14 -0.0012 -0.0157 -0.0072
(0.14) (1.83) (0.82)
Rest -0.0253 ----- -----
(1.49)
WKRest ----- 0.0181 0.0215
(1.39) (1.63)
R2 0.83 0.86 0.79
No. of Observations 41 49 41
Note: Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses 
Source: Goldin (1988, 200)
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In summary, Goldin’s results regarding the causes and consequences of maximum 
hours legislation differ substantially from those presented in Landes. By using a less 
restrictive estimation equation, Goldin found that hours worked declined for both men and 
women in states with sex-specific protective legislation; while the employment share of 
women in manufacturing did not decrease with the restrictiveness of the legislation. Indeed, 
the employment share of women in sales rose with increasing restrictiveness.
The contrasting results of the Landes and Goldin studies appear to be due to two 
sources. First, the more restrictive nature of the estimated equation regarding the effects on 
hours worked by females used by Landes. It was implicitly assumed that such legislation 
affected only female hours, suggesting that her model is subject to specification errors and 
is best viewed as a special case to that of Goldin. Second, the data series compiled by Goldin 
for the restrictiveness variable is more accurately calculated. Given the deficiencies in Landes’ 
method, the results and conclusions derived by Goldin about the consequences of maximum 
hours limitations must be accepted as having greater validity.
Breen (1988)
Breen developed a model to test for the effects of the 1911 California maximum hours law 
upon the wages and employment share of women and men in San Francisco over the period 
1884-1922. The California maximum hours law restricted employers’ use of women’s labour 
to a maximum of eight hours daily and 48 hours weekly. Piece-wise regression was used to 
test whether passage of hours legislation affected jobs targeted by it. The model tested 
consisted of the following equation:
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Yt = a + bjTrendt + ^Unemployment + dCjD^Time-Timeoj) + ut
where Yt is the dependent variable standing for measures of wages or employment. Secular 
movements in the dependent variable, independent of the dummy variables, was measured by 
the coefficient of the time trend variable, whilst the unemployment rate variable captures 
changes in the dependent variable attributable to cyclical changes in the economy unrelated 
to legislation or to World War I (WW1). D; is a dummy variable where i (0,1) represents the 
presence or absence of the 1911 maximum hours law or WWI and where Cj tests for slope 
changes as a result of structural change due to the event.
The hours law took effect in 1911, hence observations from 1884 to 1910 take a 
dummy variable value on Dj of zero and from 1912 to 1922 take a value of one. United 
States’ preparation for WWI commenced in 1915, so that observations from 1884 to 1914 
take a value on Dj of zero and from 1916 to 1922 take a value of one. Breen’s analysis 
groups employment and wage data by the sex category of an industry (industries where the 
proportion of females is greater than or equal to 23 per cent — the proportion of women in 
the San Fransisco labour force —  are categorised as female over-represented, while those 
which have a female proportion less than 23 per cent are categorised as female under­
represented); and whether it was unionised or unorganised (because San Francisco unions 
were strong and supported the hours law) in order to measure differential effects arising from 
passage of the law. Effects associated with the legislation, as compared with changes in wages 
and women’s employment share arising from WWI, can then be compared independently of 
cyclical variations and secular trends in wages and employment.
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In terms of employment effects, two hypotheses were tested. First, there would be a 
decline in the share of women in industries where women were under-represented, due to the 
exclusionary effects of the legislation. Second, legislation would increase the proportion of 
women working in industries where women were proportionately or over-represented. 
Exclusion of women from female under-represented industries would encourage the latter 
effect, as well as that identified by the Women’s Bureau Report suggesting that wherever the 
number of hours women worked exceeded the legal limit the number of women employed 
increased with passage of a maximum hours law.
Table 3 summarises Breen’s findings on the effect of the law and WWI on female 
employment. Her results did not confirm the hypothesised effects of maximum hours 
legislation. Only in female under-represented industries did women’s employment share rise. 
Women’s employment share increased with legislation only in unorganised female under­
represented industries, while their share in unionised industries only increased with WWI. 
There was no significant increase in female employment in either unionised or unorganised 
industries where women predominated either with the passage of the law or WWI.
Breen’s analysis suggests that the assertion that women lost jobs with the passage of 
protective legislation, especially in unionised female under-represented industries, has no 
statistically significant foundation in the context of San Francisco. In unorganised industries, 
women’s relative employment share rose with legislation because employment requirements 
increased, whilst there was no employment increase in unionised industries when the hours 
law was passed, since eight hours was already the established standard workday in many 
industries. Such findings suggest that the California maximum hours law caused no decline 
in women’s employment share in San Francisco manufacturing and laundry industries.
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Ta b l e  3, E m p l o y m e n t  Sh a r e  o f  W o m en  in  U n io n ise d  
a n d  U n o r g a n ise d  In d u st r ie s  in  San  
F r a n sisc o  1890=1922
Unionised Unorganised
LT23% GE23% LT23% GE
Time Trend 3.79 2.34“ * 1.65 -0.01
(2.26) (0.55) (1.34) (0.75)
Unemployment -0.13 -0.26 -0.23 1.84
(0.13) (1.47) (0.17) (1.53)
Law -0.21 3.32 1.09*** 1.19*
(0.12) (4.88) (0.13) (0.61)
WW1 1.35*“ -2.86 -0.06 -1.95
(0.33) (4.19) (0.09) (2.77)
R2 0.61 0.70 0.92 0.48
Durbin-Watson 1.42 1.30 2.05 1.86
P 0.95*** n.s. 0.90“ * n.s.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
Results are weighted least squares, or, where p is significant, 
Cochrane-Orcutt weighted least squares
significant with 10% probability of error 
significant with 5% probability of error 
significant with 1% probability of error 
n.s. not significant
LT23% = Less than 23% women employed 
GE23% = Greater than or equal to 23% women employed 
Law = California 1911 maximum hours law in effect 
WW1 = Preparation for World War 1
Source: Breen (1988, Table 4.2, 153)
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Finally, two wage hypotheses were tested by Breen: the first, that women’s wages 
increased in industries targeted by protective legislation where women were under­
represented; the second, that wages also increased for women in industries where women were 
over-represented, but less than in the first case. Table 4 summarises Breen’s conclusions in 
regard to developments in wages. It shows the estimated change in women’s wages 
attributable to the 1911 hours law and to WWI. The results indicate that, in all groups, 
women’s weekly real wages in San Francisco industries targeted by the California hours law 
rose above the 1910 base. Women’s wages in unionised industries rose fifteen and thirteen 
per cent where women were under or over-represented respectively. In unorganised industries 
women’s wages rose 16 and 14 per cent respectively. There were no significant wage 
increases for women associated with WWI. As hypothesised, protective legislation increased 
wages for all women and such increases were similar in percentage terms with the passage 
of the law. Women in all groups of industries gained from legislation, though they made no 
significant wage gains from WWI in any group of industries.
In conclusion, Breen argues that, despite the restrictiveness of the law, and, because 
of the strength of the union movement, the strong likelihood that it was enforced, the 
evidence does not support the conclusion that women targeted by the law lost employment 
share to men when it came into effect in San Francisco. However, differential employment 
effects were found between unionised and unorganised workers, rather than according to sex 
category. In industries where workers were unorganised, segregation was significantly 
reduced; in unionised industries, daily hours already averaged eight or less. Breen also found 
evidence to suggest that women’s proportional wage gains averaged more than men’s, hence 
the legislation may have reduced wage differentials between women and men.
T a b le  4. R e a l  W a g es  o f  W o m e n  in  U n io n ised  
and  Un o r g a n ise d  In d u str ies  in  San 
F r a n c isc o  1890-1922
Unionised Unorganised
LT23% GE23% GE23%
































R2 0.89 0.84 0.93 0.94
Durbin-Watson 0.54# 1.33 1.31 2.66
P n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Notes: Results are weighted least squares, or, where p is significant, Cochrane-Orcutt 
weighted least squares
significant with 10% probability of error 
significant with 5% probability of error 
significant with 1% probability of error 
n.s. not significant at p<.10 
* further correction for serial correlation needed
Source: Breen (1988, Table 4.4, 162)
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The review of the empirical evidence from the United States leads us to conclude that 
sex-specific labour legislation did not significantly reduce hours of work or employment share 
of female workers in manufacturing. There is evidence to suggest that such legislation may, 
in fact, have expanded employment for women in manufacturing, as well as other industries 
covered. Evidence from the San Francisco labour market suggests that it may also have 
increased women’s real wages and helped to reduce wage differentials between men and 
women.
It should be noted that the ad hoc single equation models employed by Landes, Goldin 
and Breen have limitations. Firstly, it would have been preferable to develop a simultaneous 
equation model containing both demand and supply features of the labour market. Secondly, 
their approach pays insufficient attention to important dynamic factors affecting labour market 
adjustments, such as those arising from technology and industrialisation. Thirdly, 
developments in wage bargaining arrangements and strategies are not allowed for. Such 
criticisms suggest that the results reviewed above should be treated with some caution. Whilst 
on balance the studies suggest that legislation did not adversely affect female employment and 
hours of work, and may have decreased wage differentials between sexes, more empirical 
work is required before more conclusive results can be presented. However, what can clearly 
be concluded from this research is that, on balance, the evidence to date does not support the 
assumption of the abolitionists that sex-specific protective legislation must necessarily 
adversely affect the employment opportunities of women.
In the next section of this paper, we undertake an exploratory investigation to 
determine to what extent the Australian experience accords with these results. Given the 
importance the sex-specific manual handling limits have played in the Australian debate on
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sex-specific labour laws, we will examine the impact of these weight laws on women’s 
employment opportunities.
MANUAL HANDLING LAW IN AUSTRALIA
The issue of sex-specific protective legislation has been the subject of much controversy in 
Australia, especially in relation to maximum weight limits in state Factory and Shop Acts for 
adult and junior female and junior male employees. Some analysts claim that sex-specific 
labour laws disadvantage work opportunities for women, citing case studies of specific 
incidents of discrimination. The best known example is that involving female applicants for 
employment at the Port Kembla steelworks (New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board, 
1984). Despite the opposition of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, the weight limits 
have been progressively rescinded by the states (Ashe, 1986). No statistical studies examining 
the effect of the laws on occupational segregation or on occupational health and safety was 
undertaken prior to their abolition.
Modifications to the relevant legislation have clearly involved a levelling down 
(Nyland and Kelly 1992). The former maximum weight which employers —  in all states 
except Western Australia —  could legally order an adult female shop or factory employee to 
lift was 16 kilograms. This provision has been replaced by a new “sex-neutral” standard, the 
most rigid provision of which decrees:
[G]enerally, no person should be required to lift, lower or carry loads above 
55 kg unless mechanical assistance or team lifting arrangements are provided 
to lower the risk of injury (National Health and Safety Commission, 1990: 35).
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This modification of Australian labour law has implications for both occupational 
health and safety and industrial efficiency, yet no empirical research has been undertaken to 
gauge the extent to which the former laws protected women employees or disadvantaged them 
in the labour market. The National Health and Medical Research Council reports that back 
pain is the greatest single cause of time loss attributable to work in Australia (National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 1987). Of 93,829 workplace injuries in New 
South Wales in 1989/90, 15,538 were caused by lifting and carrying, while another 9,859 
were caused by other forms of over exertion and physical stress. During the same period, 126 
workers were permanently maimed and 20,930 injured as a result of back injuries, at a gross 
incurred cost of almost $95 million (Workcover Authority, 1991: 28). Not surprisingly, there 
is a relationship between the risk of back injury and the lifting and carrying of heavy weights. 
According to the National Health and Safety Commission, there is evidence that the risk of 
back injury increases significantly with the lifting of objects above the range 16-20 kilograms, 
and “it is advisable to keep the load below or within this range” (National Health and Safety 
Commission, 1990: 35). It is likely, therefore, that one effect of enhancing the employer’s 
ability to order female employees to lift heavy weights will be an increase in the number of 
female workers injured through lifting accidents. Males, moreover, will also be disadvantaged 
by the change, as the former weight limits had encouraged employers to design job tasks to 
comply with the 16 kilogram parameter (New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board, 1984: 
83).
From one point of view, the risk of increased occupational injury might be an 
acceptable price to pay if the change also has the effect of increasing employment 
opportunities for women. Many of the individuals who campaigned for the abolition of sex- 
specific labour laws believe this latter effect would be one consequence of their abandonment.
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These analysts tend to perceive such laws not as instruments which protect women employees, 
but rather as “a protectionist bulwark for male employment” (Connell, 1980: 209). Refshauge 
(1982: 501), for example, has argued:
In making amendments to the (New South Wales Factories and Shops) Act in 1912, 
the ‘weight limit’ was included and served as a convenient rationale for excluding 
women from some industries, for delaying the introduction of equal pay and for 
forcing women to remain in the female-typed sections of the labour market
Refshauge (1982: 501) traces the origin of the weight limit to pre-World War I fears 
that women were taking men’s jobs, and to an alleged shortage of women to act as domestics 
for the middle class. Major problems exist with this assertion. The weight limit for adult 
females was not in fact introduced in New South Wales until 1927 (Section 37, Factories and 
Shops Amendment Act, 1927). The law was enacted by the Lang government on the 
recommendation of the second Conference on Industrial Hygiene convened by the 
Commonwealth Health Department in August 1924 (New South Wales Parliamentary Debates, 
1926, 107: 1083-84; Report o f the Second Conference on Industrial Hygiene, 1924). The 
introduction of the weight limit in New South Wales was a response to the Industrial Hygiene 
movement of the 1920s, during which period much research was undertaken into employment- 
related hazards. This research demonstrated the deleterious effects of heavy manual labour, 
particularly on women and children (International Labour Office, 1934). Weight limits were 
not introduced for adult women until 1945 in Queensland (Section 19xi, Factories and Shops 
Act), 1953 in Victoria (Section 132 of the Labour and Industry Act), 1963 in South Australia 
(Section 347 of the Industrial Code) and 1964 in Tasmania (Regulation 80[4] to Factories 
and Shops and Offices Act). Weight limits for junior females were introduced in Victoria in
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1912, and in South Australia in 1920. No legislative weight limit was ever introduced in 
Western Australia.
While the Western Australian Shop, Warehouse, Wholesale and Retail Establishment 
award imposes a 16 kilogram limit for female workers, no weight limits are specified in the 
major awards covering manufacturing workers in that state. The manufacturing sector 
therefore provides an ideal domain to test the effects of manual handling laws on the 
employment opportunities of women. If Refshauge (1982) is correct that such laws hinder the 
employment of women, it would be predicted that the unprotected women of Western 
Australia would have a relative advantage in gaining employment in the manufacturing sector, 
particularly in industries and occupations involving the manual handling of materials. To 
assess the labour market impact of the weight laws, data for each state relating to employment 
in the manufacturing sector were collected from the eight censuses taken in Australia by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) from 1911 to 1971 inclusive (this sector was called the 
industrial sector from 1911 to 1933). Results are provided in Table 5.
The figures provide no supporting evidence for the proposition that the introduction 
of sex-specific manual handling limits led to a decline in the demand for women employees 
in manufacturing. In no Australian state did the introduction of the 16 kilogram limit for adult 
women induce a reduction in the proportion of females employed in this sector. The 
experience of Western Australia reinforces this conclusion. Table 5 suggests that the absence 
of sex-specific weight limits in Western Australian manufacturing did not provide greater 
employment opportunities for women. Indeed, from 1954 onwards, the proportion of women 
in Western Australian manufacturing was the lowest of any state.
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T a b l e  5. P er c e n t a g e  o f  F em a les  in  W o r k f o r c e , 
C en su ses  1911 to  1971, In d u str ia l  
C a t e g o r ie s  (1 9 1 1 -1 9 3 3 ) , M a n u f a c t u r in g  
C a te g o r ie s  (1947-1971)
1911 1921 1933 1947 1954 1961 1966 1971
NSW 17.35 14.33 15.70 22.22 22.53 22.77 25.02 26.32
V ic 24.74 22.60 24.42 25.71 26.12 26.13 28.92 29.80
Qld 16.57 12.34 13.60 17.43 16.85 16.69 18.90 20.36







11.91 18.22 15.11 14.01 16.99 
14.69 18.29 17.29 17.81 20.17
18.40
19.72
Notes: Double Underlined Figures: Manual Handling limits 
for all females
Underlined Figures: Manual Handling limit: 
Vic - for females under 18 
SA - for females under 20
Normal Figures: No Manual Handling limits
Source: ABS Census Bulletins
Moreover, Western Australia had the second lowest growth rate in female employment 
in the manufacturing sector from 1921 to 1971, with a 41 per cent increase. Despite the 
handicap of weight limits, female employment in manufacturing increased by 87 per cent in 
Tasmania during the same period, 83 per cent in New South Wales and by 64 per cent in both 
Queensland and South Australia. Victoria recorded only a 31 per cent increase for the same
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period, but started from a higher base and retained its position as the state with the largest 
proportion of women in manufacturing.
It might be argued that the low proportion of women in Western Australia can be 
explained by differences in industry structure between states. If, for example, the state had 
a higher proportion than other states of workers in industries that have low female 
participation rates (for example, metal products and transport equipment), this may account 
for the lower overall female participation rate in Western Australia. This proposition was 
examined using data from the 1986-87 Census of Manufacturing Establishments. Overall, 
women made up 21.2 per cent of women in Western Australian manufacturing, compared with 
27.1 per cent for the rest of Australia. If the proportions of workers in each of the twelve 
two-digit ASIC (Australian Standard Industrial Classification) manufacturing categories in 
Western Australia are adjusted to the proportions applying in the rest of Australia, females 
would comprise 24.6 per cent of the manufacturing workforce in Western Australia. A 
computation based on fifty ASIC categories was also performed, but did not substantially 
increase the proportion of females in Western Australia (24.8 per cent). Even when adjusted 
for industry structure, Western Australian females do not appear to have benefited from an 
absence of weight limits. Moreover, as is shown in Table 6, Western Australian women are 
under-represented in comparison with the rest of Australia in five of the six ASIC categories 
in which women are under-represented nationally (that is, below the 26.8 per cent they 
comprise nationally in the manufacturing industry).
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T a b l e  6. P r o po r t io n  o f  W o m en  by  In d u st r y  S u b -d iv is io n , 
M a n u f a c t u r in g  In d u st r y , W e st e r n  A u st r a l ia  and 










21 Food, Beverages & Tobacco 32.2 30.8 104.5
23 Textiles 39.4 39.2 100.5
24 Clothing & Footwear 79.8 75.5 105.7
25 Wood, Wood Products 14.4 15.9 90.57
26 Paper, Paper Products 36.7 31.5 116.5
27 Chemical, Petroleum & Coal 15.5 27.6 56.2
28 Non-metallic Mineral Prod. 9.1 11.5 79.1
29 Basic Metal Products 8.3 8.1 102.5
31 Fabricated Metal Products 12.6 18.2 69.2
32 Transport Equipment 6.2 13.9 44.6
33 Other Machinery & Equip. 15.8 24.4 64.8
34 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 24.5 31.7 77.3
TOTAL 21.2 27.2 77.9
Source: ABS 8201.5, 8202.0
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These five categories — Wood and Wood Products, Non-metallic Mineral Products, 
Fabricated Metal Products, Transport Equipment and Other Machinery and Equipment —  are 
precisely the type of industries where Western Australian women might be expected to have 
a competitive advantage if weight limits did in fact restrict employment opportunities for 
females.
While the introduction of manual handling legislation does not appear to have 
adversely affected the proportion of women employed in the manufacturing sector, it is 
nevertheless still possible, as Scutt (1980: 143) asserts, that “women were eliminated from 
(some) factory (or shop) jobs” as a result of the legislation. This would presumably have been 
those jobs which require the manual handling of materials. To test this proposition, 1986 
census data were examined to determine whether any such effect could be detected. Results 
are summarised in Table 7. The absence of the weight limit in Western Australia provided 
women with no additional opportunities in occupations commonly requiring manual handling 
skills (labourers, plant and machine operators, tradepersons). The state has the lowest 
proportion of female labourers in the manufacturing sector, 22 per cent compared with 31 per 
cent nationally. The state also has the second lowest proportion of female plant and machine 
operators and tradepersons. In the five occupational categories which do not commonly 
involve manual handling skills (1, 2, 3, 5 & 6) the proportion of women employed in Western 
Australia is close to the national average in four of the categories. Overall, only 21.64 per 
cent of the manufacturing workforce in Western Australia is female, compared with 26.83 
nationally. Most of the difference is accounted for in occupations which involve manual 
handling.
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T a b l e  7. P e r c e n t a g e  o f  w o m e n  in  e a c h  m a jo r  o c c u p a t io n a l
CATEGORY, MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1986 CENSUS
Occupations NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas Aust
1 . Managers/Administrators 11 80 11.32 12 .77 10.53 11.82 9.33 11.63
2. Professionals 21 68 19.38 21.64 15.09 20.14 15.87 20.24
3. Para-professionals 19 64 17 .57 15.31 14.36 12.63 18 .74 17.53
4 . Tradepersons 6 24 7.59 5.73 6.54 5.93 7.10 6.63
5. Clerks 74 12 71.99 72.90 67 .71 72 .59 63.63 72.38
6. Sales/Personal Services 35 03 37.63 38 .37 34.87 35.09 38.84 36.42
7 . Plant & Machine Operators 30 16 39.65 23.42 27.48 18.46 17 . 40 31.73
8. Labourers 30 58 36.72 23.95 31.05 22 .24 25.89 31.15
All occupations 27 01 30.21 23 .24 24.30 21.64 20.95 26.83
Source: ABS 2490.0, 2491.0, 2492.0, 2493.0, 2494.0, 2495.0, 2498.0
It might be the case that these results have nothing to do with the existence of 
legal weight limits, and instead are caused by some socio-demographic characteristic of 
Western Australia. To test this possibility, an examination was made of the percentage of 
women involved in the major occupations in the Wholesale and Retail Trade. As stated 
above, in this industry sector, Western Australian women were subject to a 16 kilogram 
limit through their industrial award, and were thus on the same footing as their colleagues 
in the rest of Australia as regard weight limits. Results are tabulated in Table 8. In this 
industry sector with weight limits operative in all states, Western Australia ranks a close 
third in terms of female participation in labouring occupations, is third in female 
participation in plant and machine operating occupations, and fourth in female 
participation as tradepersons. In contrast with manufacturing, female participation for these
31
occupations in the wholesale and retail trade sector is within a per cent or two of the 
national average.
The data, therefore, provide no support for the theory that weight limits create an 
overall restriction of employment opportunities. The pattern of results is quite different 
to that which would be expected if the assumption were true.
T a b l e  8. P e r c e n t a g e  o f  W o m en  in  E a c h  M a jo r
O c c u pa t io n a l  Ca t e g o r y , W h o l e sa l e  a n d  
R e ta il  T r a d e , 1986 C en su s
Occupations NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas Aust
1 . Managers/Administrators 22 .23 26.98 30.19 28.62 28. 41 29.90 28.00
2. Professionals 29.54 28 .11 29.34 27 .75 28. 72 25.83 28.92
3. Para-professionals 26.24 23.75 19.50 22.31 17 78 23.38 23.34
4. Tradepersons 6.23 7.69 7.26 8.02 7 36 8.67 7.13
5. Clerks 79. 96 77 . 64 78 .71 76.25 76. 81 72.69 78 .40
6. Sales/Personal Services 59.90 60.01 60.10 60 . 62 63. 01 59.54 60 .42
7 . Plant & Machine Operators 17 .32 26.57 13.80 19.52 18. 02 11. 99 19.68
8 . Labourers 34.58 32.10 36.10 36.62 35. 93 34.86 34.52
All occupations 43.50 43.09 44.18 43.76 44 91 43.00 43.69
Source: ABS 2490.0, 2491.0, 2492.0, 2493.0, 2494.0, 2495.0, 2498.0
If, as Connell (1980) and others have argued, sex-specific weight limits have 
provided a protectionist bulwark for male employment, it must be concluded the laws 
have not been very effective in this regard. Given that these legal limits have on occasions 
been used in a discriminatory fashion to exclude women from some manufacturing jobs, 
it would appear that the limits have also facilitated the entry of women into other 
manufacturing jobs. The introduction of the limits may have induced some employers to
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employ women in jobs traditionally done by males so as to avail themselves of access to 
a larger employment pool in cases where the tasks did not exceed the limit, or where they 
could be easily redesigned to comply with it. Alternatively, or in addition, the introduction 
of the limits may have enhanced the attractiveness to women of jobs involving manual 
handling, by increasing confidence in their ability to perform the tasks without injury. It 
is thus suggested that the weight limits in a sense may have legitimised the employment 
of women in manual handling tasks, leading to a decrease in occupational segregation in 
traditionally female under-represented labouring occupations.
On the basis of the above results, it appears that a likely effect of the simple 
abolition of the weight limits is that employment opportunities for female workers will 
diminish. In a situation where an employee can be requested to lift weights of up to 55 
kilograms, fewer women may be attracted to jobs involving manual handling.
CONCLUSION
Sex-specific labour legislation has been widely recognised as an area of law which 
requires reform. These laws have sometimes been used to adversely affect the interests 
of women by reducing their opportunities in the labour market. This form of 
discrimination is unacceptable. However, for many analysts, the elimination of the 
discriminatory element in the laws has been rendered difficult by the fact that their simple 
abolition would reduce the degree of legal protection from excessive work demands 
enjoyed by female workers. For this reason, these analysts have argued that the extension
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of the laws to cover men is the only acceptable reform strategy. The fundamental 
questions, according to Lewis and Lewis (1977: 868), are:
What is the better measure of equality — for women to die like men, or for men 
to live (a little bit) like women? Can we not have the benefits of sexual parity in 
terms of equal opportunities for personal achievement, as well as individual 
survival?
The observation that levelling up is the only acceptable reform strategy, however, 
has been challenged by those who believe that a reduction in the degree of protection 
enjoyed by women employees is an acceptable price to pay for the removal of laws which 
restrict women’s job opportunities. These individuals have accepted uncritically that sex- 
specific labour laws must have increased occupational sex-segregation. Empirical evidence 
from the United States suggests that legislation limiting the hours of female workers did 
not reduce their employment share in manufacturing, and may have led to an increase in 
their real wages and a reduction in wage differentials. Similarly, an examination of 
Australian data produced no support for the proposition that protective weight laws restrict 
the overall employment opportunities of women in the manufacturing industry. 
Consequently, if the objective of abandoning or replacing these laws is the attainment of 
more jobs for women, it must be concluded that this would amount to the payment of a 
high price — a possible increase in workplace injuries — for a benefit which may be non­
existent. Few people would disagree that the discriminatory content in the sex-specific 
labour laws needs to be eliminated. However, reform of these laws must be designed to 
both enhance employment opportunities for women, and to ensure that both sexes are 
provided with safe conditions of employment. Any other approach is simply irresponsible.
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APPENDIX
1. The general specification of the identity estimated is:
la. Hours 19 = (%Female) HF + (1 - %Female) HM + (%Female x LawDum) p[;HF +
[(1 - %Female) x LawDum]PMHM
Where:
HF - Average scheduled hours for females in unconstrained states.
HM - Average scheduled hours for males in unconstrained states.
Pp - Marginal impact of hours laws on mean female hours (expected to be negative). 
PM - Marginal impact of hours laws on mean male hours.
Re-writing la  yields the Goldin (1988) estimated equation:
lb. Hours 19 = HM + (HF - HM)%Female + (HF(iF - HMPM)(%Female x LawDum) + 
HMpMLawDum
The coefficient on HM is simply the average scheduled number of male hours in 
unconstrained states. The coefficient on %Female is the difference between male and 
female hours in unconstrained states. The coefficient on (%Female x LawDum) is the 
difference in the decline in hours, due to legislation, of women compared with men.
35
Finally, the coefficient on LawDum is the decrease in the number of hours worked by 
men in states with hours legislation.
The results reported by Landes (1980) assume that (3M = 0, with the impact of 
hours laws constrained to fall entirely on female employees. Hence, the estimated equation 
is more restrictive than lb, being (see Table 1):
lc. Hours 19 = Hm + (HF - HM)%Female + HF[\,(%Female x LawDum)
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